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Criminal procedure is organized as a tournament with predefined roles. We show that assum-
ing the role of a defense counsel or prosecutor leads to role induced bias even if participants 
are asked to predict a court ruling after they have ceased to act in that role, and if they expect 
a substantial financial incentive for being accurate. The bias is not removed either if partici-
pants are instructed to predict the court ruling in preparation of plea bargaining. In line with 
parallel constraint satisfaction models for legal decision making, findings indicate that role 
induced bias is driven by coherence effects (Simon, 2004), that is, systematic information dis-
tortions in support of the favored option. This is mainly achieved by downplaying the im-
portance of conflicting evidence. These distortions seem to stabilize interpretations, and peo-
ple do not correct for this bias. Implications for legal procedure are briefly discussed. 
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Introduction 
Dramatic effects of social roles on behavior have been repeatedly demonstrated in social psy-
chology (e.g., Haney, Banks, & Zimbardo, 1973; Janis & King, 1954; Thompson & Loewen-
stein, 1992; Vidmar & Laird, 1983; Zimbardo, 1965). It also has been shown that social theo-
ries are perseverant, once a subject has been induced to adopt them (Anderson, Lepper, & 
Ross, 1980),  and that bias can result from a person being psychologically invested in a cause 
(Markman & Hirt, 2002). It has been discussed that this bias is highly relevant for law be-
cause roles influence (and often limit) choices (Sunstein, 1996), as well as preparatory acts, 
like the search for evidence (O'Brien, 2009). Role induce bias might also be one of the causes 
for attorneys overconfidence in predicting case outcomes (Goodman-Delahunty, Granhag, 
Hartwig, & Loftus, 2010).  In the current paper, we are interested in the cognitive mechanisms 
that are induced by assuming the role of one or the other side in a legal dispute. Specifically, 
we focus on the mechanism of coherence construction (Robbennolt, 2004; Simon, 2004; 
Thagard, 2003) which might induce prosecutors and counsels for the defense to be–partially 
unbeknownst to themselves–biased by the role that has been assigned to them.  
Coherence Construction by Parallel Constraint Satisfaction 
Coherence construction models assume that legal decision making is based on constructing 
and evaluating coherent interpretations or stories from the available pieces evidence (see Pen-
nington & Hastie, 1988, for a classic approach). Formally, this can be implemented in parallel 
constraint satisfaction (PCS) models using symbolic networks (Glöckner & Betsch, 2008; 
Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Robbennolt, 2004; Simon, 2004; Spellman, 2010; Thagard, 2003). 
PCS models basically assume that automatically spreading activation processes lead to con-
structing the best (i.e., most coherent) interpretation—in the case of criminal procedure: a sto-
ry about what happened that purportedly led to crime—under parallel consideration of all 
constraints resulting from the evidence and all logical relations. This is achieved in an overall 
evaluation of the structure of the evidence, which leads to increasing the weight given to (i.e., 
the activation of) information speaking for the strongest option and by decreasing the weight 
given to information speaking against it. Information is thus polarized (Simon, 2004, p. 523). 
This systematic revaluation of the evidence is called a coherence shift
1 (Holyoak & Simon, 
1999) or coherence effect (Simon, 2004). Coherence shifts have been demonstrated in a wide 
variety of tasks (e.g., Brownstein, Read, & Simon, 2004; DeKay, Patino-Echeverri, & Fisch-
beck, 2009a; DeKay, Patino-Echeverri, & Fischbeck, 2009b; Glöckner, Betsch, & Schindler, 
2010; Russo, et al., 2008; Russo, et al., 1998; Simon, Krawczyk, Bleicher, & Holyoak, 2008; 
Simon, Krawczyk, & Holyoak, 2004) and particularly for legal judgments (Carlson & Russo, 
2001; Glöckner & Engel, 2008; Holyoak & Simon, 1999; Simon, 2004). It has, however, been 
shown that coherence effects are transient and disappear after some time (Simon, Krawczyk, 
                                        
1   In a different research tradition, it is also referred to more generally as predecisional information distor-
tion (e.g., Bond, Carlson, Meloy, Russo, & Tanner, 2007; Brownstein, 2003; Russo, Carlson, Meloy, & 
Yong, 2008; Russo, Meloy, & Medvec, 1998).  
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et al., 2008). In three studies we investigate in how far coherence effects drive role-induced 
bias and whether individuals are able to correct for the bias when being motivated to so.  
Previous Research on Role-Induced Bias 
Role-induced bias has already been demonstrated in a previous study (Simon, Snow, & Read, 
2004). Participants were asked to assume the role of a third year law student assigned to a 
retired judge who serves as an arbitrator in labor law disputes. Participants were informed that 
the judge had already heard the evidence and taken her decision (the contents of which was 
unknown to the participants). In the cover story, it was announced that participants would lat-
er be asked to assist the judge in drafting her opinion (which actually did not happen). After 
reading the evidence, participants were asked to give their own verdicts. Simon et al. found 
significant biases on judgment induced by assigned roles, and coherence shifts in the direction 
supporting them.  
In a further study, Simon, Stenston, and Read (2008) instructed participants to investigate a 
university cheating case to prepare an adversarial hearing. Participants were assigned different 
roles, either to investigate the case on behalf of the university or of the student, but they were 
also instructed to be fair and objective. Besides replicating the finding that role assignment 
leads to biased judgment and coherence shifts, Simon et al. showed that role assignment led 
participants to wish that their side would win. Using the same paradigm, it could be shown 
that the degree of partisanship, that is how strongly participants wanted their side (role) to 
win, increases the bias in judgments and information distortions (Simon, Stenstrom, & Read, 
2009). A structural equation model analysis revealed a good fit of a model assuming that the 
effect of partisanship on judgments of guilt was simultaneously mediated by motivation and 
coherence shifts. It is the aim of this study to disentangle both causes, and to test whether role 
induced bias is even present if it is in conflict with participants’ induced motives. 
Mechanisms Causing Role Induced Bias 
Role induced bias might be caused by deliberate, motivated reasoning (Kunda, 1990).
2 Indi-
viduals might come to the conclusion that is mandated by their role, which would account for 
the motivational effect observed by Simon et al. (2008; 2009) and would be in line with re-
search in social psychology (e.g., Janis & King, 1954; Zimbardo, 1965). Yet the bias might 
also emerge unintentionally (Kunda & Thagard, 1996; Monroe & Read, 2008), which could 
be explained by the automatic activation of unconscious goals in PCS networks. Furthermore, 
role-induced bias might be caused by confirmatory information search (e.g., Betsch, Ha-
berstroh, Glöckner, Haar, & Fiedler, 2001; Fiedler, 2000; O'Brien, 2009; Snyder & Swann, 
1978; Wason, 1960); people might mainly look up information supporting the hypothesis they 
have already formed, or they think is desired by their role. 
                                        
2   It should, however, be noted that motivated reasoning is not necessarily only a deliberate process (see 
also below).  
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If the bias was intentionally or unintentionally formed by motivated reasoning, one should 
expect it to disappear when motivational goals are changed. It is the primary purpose of our 
experiments to test whether role induced bias is lasting, even if participants have no longer 
any reason to be biased and if, to the contrary, they are motivated to judge neutrally. In this 
respect, PCS models are skeptical. Once induced, the bias should prevail even if goals change, 
and it should be relatively hard for people to form alternative interpretations. This prediction 
results from the fact that interpretations, once they have been formed, stabilize themselves by 
coherence shifts in the respective direction (Read, Vanman, & Miller, 1997). Stated different-
ly, after forming the preferred interpretation, all pieces of evidence are viewed in the light of 
this interpretation, and their evaluation is biased to support it. Hence, adding single pieces of 
evidence will often not lead to changes in interpretation (there will be no accommodation). 
Rather the new information will be revaluated to match the overall interpretation (there will 
be assimilation) (see Simon, 2004, for a discussion of this effect related to jurors failure to 
exclude inadmissible evidence). This could induce people to stick to their initial interpretation 
instead of correcting for role-induced bias even if they are no longer acting in the assigned 
role and have an incentive to form a more balanced view (see Experiments 1 and 2), or if, 
while the role persists, it now calls for accuracy, not for persuasion (see Experiment 3). Re-
cent studies on the Einstellung (set) effect demonstrate such unintended stickiness effects 
even for (chess-) experts, showing that initially formed interpretations unconsciously bias fur-
ther information processing against the explicit intent to look for alternatives (Bilalic, 
McLeod, & Gobet, 2008, 2010). However, findings on the transience of coherence effects 
(Simon, Krawczyk, et al., 2008) might indicate that also role-induced bias disappear after a 
cooling off period.  
Policy Implications 
It is of high public interest to identify and reduce biases in legal decision making, and a large 
literature in the fields of law and psychology (see Daftary-Kapur, Dumas, & Penrod, 2010, for 
a recent review; e.g., Englich, Mussweiler, & Strack, 2005; Hastie, Schkade, & Payne, 1999a, 
1999b) and empirical legal studies (e.g., Guthrie, Rachlinski, & Wistrich, 2000; Guthrie, 
Rachlinski, & Wistrich, 2007; Jolls & Sunstein, 2006; Korobkin, 2003; Rachlinski, 2006; 
Wistrich, Guthrie, & Rachlinski, 2005) is concerned with this issue. Our study contributes to 
this literature in that it informs policy makers about the robustness of role induced bias, and 
about the possibility to remove the bias by changing incentives. 
Studies on settlements in tort cases provide a first indication that role-induced biases might 
even prevail in such situations (Loewenstein, Issacharoff, Camerer, & Babcock, 1993). In a 
deliberately ambiguous situation, participants were randomly assigned to the roles of plaintiff 
and defendant and asked to negotiate the settlement of a tort case. Payoffs depended on the 
negotiation outcome. Additionally, participants were informed that a real judge had already 
taken a decision and they were asked to predict his verdict, before they engaged in negotia-
tions. If they came close enough, they received a bonus payment. While the negotiation range  
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was US$ 10, the bonus was at most US$ 1. Relative to the income from negotiating effective-
ly, the bonus was thus relatively small. The predictions were influenced by assigned roles, but 
to a smaller degree than their judgment about a “fair” settlement price. The authors explain 
their overall pattern of results by the self-serving interpretation of fairness. The aim to earn 
more money in the experiment activated different fairness norms which in turn lead to differ-
ences in predictions and judgments. Later contributions demonstrate that the bias requires 
knowing the role (Babcock, Loewenstein, Issacharoff, & Camerer, 1995), that it can also be 
shown in the field (Babcock & Loewenstein, 1997), that it is reduced by damage caps (Bab-
cock & Pogarsky, 1999) and by split-award statutes (Landeo, 2009).  
Our Contribution 
Our main contribution is to test whether the mere assignment of a role biases judgment, even 
if the bias is no longer self-serving and if there are medium (Experiment 1) or high (Experi-
ment 2) monetary incentives to correct for it. To that end we remove any motivational ele-
ment for participants to bias judgment and give people a clear and explicit incentive to over-
come potential biases in their predictions of the court ruling. We do so by two interventions. 
As in (Loewenstein, et al., 1993), we ask our participants to predict. But unlike the earlier ex-
periment, in our experiment only prediction is incentivized. Also participants are not asked to 
predict before, but after acting in their assigned roles. Therefore when making their predic-
tions, participants no longer have any pecuniary or moral reason to fulfill role expectations. 
Actually when they stay influenced by their previous role, they know this is likely to decrease 
their payoff. For predicting (postdicting) a court decision is the only task that is left, and the 
only monetary incentive present in the entire experiment. In the third experiment we induce 
an intrinsic motivation to correct for role-induced bias by making clear to the participants that 
a bias would be detrimental for their role and for the side they represent.   
We also go beyond the literature in that we generate measures for the underlying mental pro-
cesses. To that end, we add an information-board paradigm which allows for tracing peoples 
information search (e.g., Payne, Bettman, & Johnson, 1988). Additionally, we trace how the 
assignment of the role changes the valuation of the evidence. We thus measure coherence 
shifts (Holyoak & Simon, 1999). Using an exploratory account and without a definite hypoth-
esis we record decision time to learn more about the underlying mental process (cf. Glöckner, 
2009; Glöckner, 2010). Finally, the fact that we use a real criminal case with official model 
jury instructions and let people sketch pleadings should increase external validity.  
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Hypotheses 
Based on a PCS perspective, we predict that people assigned to the roles of defense counsel or 
prosecutor show role-induced biases even if they are asked to postdict a court decision after 
they have finished acting on the role and if they have a medium (Experiment 1) or high (Ex-
periment 2) monetary incentive or if they are intrinsically motivated (Experiment 3) to predict 
correctly. We expect this to hold even when controlling for biases in information search (H1). 




Participants and Design 
The experiment was conducted at the decision lab of the Max Planck Institute for Research on 
Collective Goods in Bonn, Germany. One-hundred forty-nine students of different majors 
participated in the experiment, 63 of them were female. Participants were randomly assigned 
to the roles of prosecutor or defense counsel, constituting the only between-subjects factor. 
The experiment consisted of a pre-test and a main-test which were separated by an unrelated 
filler task that took about 15min. The overall experiment lasted between 1 and 1.5 hours and 
students received a show-up fee of 12 € (approximately USD 16.80). If they correctly predict-
ed that the real court convicted the defendant, they received an extra 5 € (see below). 
Materials 
We use a translated and slightly modified version of a complex legal case constructed und 
repeatedly used by Dan Simon and colleagues (originally called Jason Wells case; Simon, 
Snow, et al., 2004); the complete case can be found in the appendix. In this case, a company 
accuses one of its employees of having stolen money from the company safe. The case con-
sists of six pieces of information pro-guilty and contra-guilty, each. This information consists 
of facts and background beliefs. It is known that the money was stolen using the regular ac-
cess code which only a few persons had. The money was stolen in the evening and the time 
was recorded. The crucial pro-guilty facts are a) the low number of persons who knew the 
access code to the safe from which the money was stolen, b) the high confidence level of an 
eyewitness who afterwards reported having seen the accused person at the site of crime, and 
c) the low relative frequency of a certain type of car in the region which was seen at the site of 
crime and which is also driven by the defendant. The strongest contra-guilty fact is that d) the 
defendant was seen shortly after the crime in a place which was hard to reach in such a short 
time. We frame the case as criminal procedure and use translated versions of the official mod-
el jury instructions of the Ninth Circuit (see appendix).  
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Procedure 
The experiment was fully computerized. Except for our manipulation of role, we closely fol-
lowed the procedure used in previous studies on coherence shifts (Simon, Snow, et al., 2004). 
In the pre-test, subjects read short scenarios about social interactions. These scenarios contain 
the relevant cues of the legal case, albeit in different situations, and were rated on a gliding 
scale from -500 (strongly disagree) to 500 (strongly agree). For instance, participants read 
that a bystander was 95% confident of having identified a specific person bringing some 
flowers for a colleague after work. They then were asked how strongly they agree with the 
statement that the identification makes it likely that this person indeed brought the flowers.
3 
After completing the filler task, participants completed the main study. To implement our ma-
nipulation of role, participants were instructed to assume the role of an intern with either 
prosecution or defense. 
In both conditions they then learned that they would be asked to sketch the pleading for their 
side after they have read the evidence. They then were presented with case materials which 
consist of a general instruction, including the “beyond a reasonable doubt” standard of proof, 
some background information on the defendant, and isolated pieces of evidence, as described 
in the appendix. They could read all information at their own speed. Each piece of evidence 
that was presented had an easy to remember but neutral title. Participants were then given 20 
minutes to sketch their pleading in a large text-box. Specifically, they were asked to write 
down an outline for a pleading in bullet-points. While sketching their pleadings, participants 
could look up all pieces of information in a computerized information-board (Figure 1), which 
is a standard paradigm in studies on preference decisions (Betsch, et al., 2001; Norman & 
Schulte-Mecklenbeck, 2010). Each information card was labeled with the titles introduced in 
the initial presentation and the information could be selected by mouse click. Subjects were 
free to revisit any of these pieces as many times as they wanted. We recorded both the aver-
age number and the duration of these visits (taking into account initial reading of all pieces of 





                                        
3   The social scenarios were carefully constructed by Simon et al. (2004) to allow measuring the same cues 
that are relevant for the legal case. Half of the questions concerned general beliefs and were essentially 
identical between scenario and case (e.g., generally, one can assume that a person who committed a crime 
will laps back into crime; generally, you can trust eye-witness reports if persons were seen once or twice). 
The remaining questions concerned evaluations of the situation such as the reliability of the eye-witness 
report for the specific situation. 
4   Note that each of the 12 information pages contained several pieces of information (see Figure 1 and ap-
pendix). For the analyses reported below we classified each page as mainly containing pro guilty vs. con-
tra guilty evidence or as being ambiguous. Pages titled Technician, Criminal record, White car, Debts, 
and Travel expenses were considered pro guilty evidence. Pages School, and Flower store were consid-
ered contra guilty evidence.  
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Note. All 12 pieces of evidence that could be looked up are listed in the appendix with the short title in 
brackets.  
 
Immediately after subjects had finished their sketch of pleading, they were asked to estimate 
(postdict) how a real German court had decided the (mock) case. To induce serious thought 
and to provide a high incentive for accuracy, in the instruction for this screen we promised an 
extra 5 € to those who predicted the decision correctly; actually this bonus was the only pay-
off contingent on participants’ action. To that end, and in the interest of even higher external 
validity, we had asked a criminal chamber of the regional court (Landgericht)
5 of Oldenburg 
to tell us how they would have decided, had exactly this evidence, with exactly this instruc-
tion on the standard of proof, been presented to them. Of these four judges, three would have 
convicted the defendant, while one would have acquitted him. So their overall decision was to 
convict. We recorded the time participants took for making this decision measured from onset 
of the instruction to making a final choice. Hence, the measure included time both for reading 
and deciding.  
Subsequently, participants estimated the probability that the defendant had stolen the money 
from the safe which we used as subjective measure for the probability of guilt. Finally, to al-
low measuring coherence shifts, subjects re-rated the evidence from the pre-test, using the 
same scale. 
                                        
5   In Germany, regional courts are courts of first instance for severe crime. The chamber that decided on our 
case materials usually hears first instance criminal cases. 
Standard of proof  Accusation  Technician 
School  Safe  Hans‘s career 
Hans’s Character  Criminal Record  White Car 
Debts  Flower store  Travel Expenses 
Technician 
A technician who had been called to repair the photocopier testified that 
he had seen someone leave the accountant’s office in great haste at about 
7.15 pm. When questioned by the detective a day after the incident, the 
technician identified this person as Hans. When asked how sure he was 
about this, the technician said he was “at least 95%” certain. He ex-






























































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































































 Role-Induced Bias in Estimations of Verdict  
As can be seen in Table 1, the assigned role influenced the estimation of the verdict, in that 
there were 14% more predictions of conviction for persons in the prosecution role, compared 
to persons in the defense role (in this and all following comparisons we report absolute differ-
ences in probabilities). This effect was accompanied by a 16% increase in the average subjec-
tive probability of guilt.
6 To test H1 for significance, we conducted a logistic regression with 
predicted verdict as the dependent variable and role as the explanatory variable (using robust 
standard errors). The effect of role turned out significant (Table 2, model 1).
7   
Table 2: Six logistic regressions on prediction of conviction in Experiment 1.  
  (1)  (2) (3) (4) (5) (6) 
  guilty  Guilty guilty guilty guilty guilty 
         
role  prosecution 0.59+   0.64+  -0.62  -0.56 
(1=yes, 0=no)  (1.76)    (1.81)    (-1.31)  (-1.12) 
         
Inspections of pro-
guilty evidence 
 1.29***  1.31***      1.68** 
 (3.63)  (3.68)      (3.25) 
         
Inspections of con-
tra-guilty evidence 
  -0.63*  -0.61*    -0.85* 
  (-2.46)  (-2.39)    (-2.37) 
         
reevaluation of pro-
guilty evidence 
      0.0054** 0.0057** 0.0066** 
      (2.77) (2.91) (2.79) 
         
reevaluation of con-
tra-guilty evidence 
      -0.011*** -0.012*** -0.012*** 
      (-5.30) (-5.04) (-5.18) 
         
Constant 3.19e-16  -0.87*  -1.26**  -0.24  0.0027  -1.54** 
  (0.00)  (-2.15) (-2.77) (-1.04) (0.01) (-2.72) 
Observations  149  149 149 149 149 149 
Pseudo R
2  0.016  0.075 0.091 0.306 0.316 0.384 
 
Note. Unstandardized coefficients; robust standard errors used; z statistics are given in parentheses 
below coefficients. 
Variables “inspections” indicate how often the respective participant has viewed the total of pro- or 
contra-guilty pieces of evidence when preparing her pleadings. Variables “revaluation” measure co-
herence shifts, as explained in detail in the next section.  
+ p < .05 (one-sided), * p < .05 (two-sided), ** p < .01 (two-sided), *** p < .001 (two-sided) 
 
To check the robustness of this result, we added the frequency of visiting pro-guilty vs. con-
tra-guilty information as control variables. Although information inspections have a signifi-
cant effect on the verdict (Table 2, model 2), adding them to role does not affect the main ef-
fect of role (Table 2, model 3), which provides additional support for H1. Note that the coeffi-
cient for role remained essentially the same as in the regression with only role as predictor. 
This suggests that the effect of role is not mediated by differences in information search.
8  
                                        
6   All analyses reported in Table 2 also hold in regressions with subjective probability as dependent variable. 
7   Note, that since we have a directed hypothesis, a one-sided test has to be used, which turned out to be 
significant (p = .039). 
8   The effect also prevails if we control for the time people took for visiting pro and contra-guilty evidence, 
not reported.  
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To test rigorously whether the effect of role on verdict is mediated by information search, we 
performed mediation analysis (Figure 2a). Since we want to test a mediation model with more 
than one mediator which includes continuous and binary variables, we cannot use the standard 
procedure proposed by Sobel (1982). Instead we revert to a methodology based on standardiz-
ing coefficients and bootstrapping (Ender, 2010; see also MacKinnon & Dwyer, 1993; 
Preacher & Hayes, 2008). The results reveal that the influence of role on the prediction of the 
judgment is not mediated by differences in information search. Neither one of the single indi-
rect effects (pro-guilty: coeff = .002, 95CI: LL=-.11; UL=.12; contra-guilty: coeff = .019, 95CI: 
LL=-.04; UL=.12)
9 nor the combined indirect effect (coeff = .020, 95CI: LL=-.04; UL=.10) 
were significantly different from zero, which would be indicated by zero being outside the 
95CI. As can be seen in Figure 2a, the direct effect did not decrease when including the infor-
mation search variables.  
Figure 2: Mediation analysis for the effect of role on judgment. 
 
















                                        
9   The indirect effect is the product of the coefficient explaining the mediator by the independent variable 
(in the first case: of role explaining the frequency of inspecting pro-guilty evidence) times the coefficient 
of the mediator explaining the dependent variable. The combined effect is the sum of all indirect effects. 
In all analyses we estimated coefficients and confidence intervals (CIs) based on 5000 iterations in boot-
strapping. CIs from bootstrapping are bias corrected. 
role prosecutions 
(1= yes; 0=no) 
prediction of verdict 
(1= guilty; 0= not guilty) 
inspections of pro-guilty 
evidence (frequency) 
inspections of contra-
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Coherence Shifts and their Impact on Prediction 
Our second hypothesis posits that role induced biases in predictions of verdicts are driven by 
coherence shifts, that is systematic revaluations of the evidence in the direction of the emerg-
ing judgment. This hypothesis would be supported by the data if we can show that coherence 
shifts mediate the effect of role on verdict predictions. To analyze the mediating role of co-
herence shifts on predictions, for each participant we first calculated average revaluation 
scores for pro-guilty and contra-guilty evidence by subtracting pre-test from post-test valua-
tions of the same pieces of evidence. Revaluation scores can range from -500 to 500. Positive 
scores indicate that the valuation of the respective information was increased over the study; 
negative scores indicate that the valuation was decreased.  
In line with previous findings, we observe systematic coherence shifts that are induced by role 
(Table 1). Participants in the prosecution role strongly devalue the contra-guilty evidence. By 
contrast, they give slightly more weight to pro-guilty evidence in the post-test as compared to 
the pre-test. Participants in the defense role strongly decrease the valuation of the pro-guilty 
evidence, while their evaluation of the contra-guilty evidence remains almost stable. Hence, 
role seems to induce differential effects on coherence shifts. Note, that coherence shifts were 
essentially confined to devaluing conflicting evidence, while supporting evidence is hardly 
affected. Furthermore, the spreading apart due to coherence shifts was overall much stronger 
for prosecution than for defense as indicated by the larger difference between reevaluations of 
pro- and contra-guilty arguments. We tested our second hypothesis using regressions and a 
mediation analysis. Logistic regressions reveal that coherence shifts explain verdict predic-
tions (Table 2, model 4), and that the effect of role on judgment disappears if we control for 
coherence shifts (Table 2, model 5). As a robustness check, we also estimated the same model 
with additional controls for information search which lead to the same results (Table 2, model 
6). Mediation analysis shows that coherence shifts indeed completely mediate the effect of 
role assignment (see Figure 2b). The revaluation of pro-guilty evidence (indirect effects: coeff 
= .068, 95CI: LL= .02; UL=.14) and of contra-guilty evidence (coeff = .24, 95CI: LL= .14; 
UL=.36) both individually and jointly (coeff = .31, 95CI: LL= .19; UL=.44) mediate the effect 
of role on verdict predictions. The overall indirect effect remains significant and does not 
change in size (coeff = .31, 95CI: LL= .17; UL=.44) if we control for amount and frequency of 
information search (pro- and contra-guilty, respectively) as covariates in the mediation clearly 
supporting H2. Note, that adding coherence shifts as mediators even reversed the effect of 
role on verdict predictions, which might indicate that persons try to correct for their previous-
ly assigned role. However, the reversed effect was not predicted and does not reach conven-
tional significance levels in a two-sided test.  
Influence of Deliberation Time on Role Induced Bias 
Finally, we aimed to test whether participants who take more time for making a prediction 
exhibit a smaller bias. This might be due to either of two mechanisms: a) people might be able 
to correct for the bias, particularly if they try hard and take a long time to decide, or b) per- 
13 
sons who are less biased a priori take longer to make the prediction. We do not aim to identify 
which mechanism prevails (i.e., the direction of causality for the effect) but merely take an 
exploratory account to investigate whether there is such an effect at all. 
We therefore conducted a logistic regression with verdict prediction as dependent variable 
and role, deliberation time (ln-transformed) and their interaction as predictors (main effects 
were centered). The main effect of prosecution on guilt remained significant (b = .59, z = 
1.70, p = .045, one-sided). More interestingly, however, we also found that participants who 
took longer to predict the court ruling were less prone to bias, as indicated by a significant 
interaction between time and role (b = -1.85, z = -3.06, p = 0.002). Calculating the main effect 
of role for subsamples split along the median of deliberation times revealed that there was a 
role induced bias for persons with short (p = .003) but not for persons with long (p = .66) de-
liberation times.  
Discussion 
Overall, our data support the notion that even in situations in which people have ceased to act 
in their assigned roles and have a monetary incentive to make correct predictions, a role in-
duced bias prevails. The effect seems to be driven by coherence shifts that persons do not cor-
rect for. The effect of role on verdict prediction in this study (i.e., 14%) is comparable to the 
effect on verdicts observed in a previous study (Simon et al., 2008 found an effect of 17%). 
Interestingly, however, people that reflect longer do not exhibit role induced biases in predic-
tions.  
Note that by our study we can exclude three prominent alternative explanations. The bias can-
not be self-serving, in a monetary sense. While acting in their assigned roles, participants did 
not take any money-relevant choices. The only monetary incentive was for accurate prediction 
of the court’s decision. Second, although we find evidence for confirmatory information 
search, it does not mediate the effect of role on verdict prediction. Finally, the bias cannot 
result from an earlier decision participants have taken, as dissonance reduction would suggest 
(Festinger, 1957), because participants did not commit themselves at all to a choice.
10  
Nevertheless, it could be argued that participant’s incentive for correcting their role induced 
bias was still too weak in our first study. Therefore we conducted a second study in which 
incentives for correct predictions were drastically increased. 
                                        
10   Since persons worked for about 20 minutes in their role, it cannot be ruled out that dissonance phenomena 
still played a role. Note, however, that Parallel Constraint Satisfaction processes have been successfully 
used to model dissonance phenomena as well (Shultz & Lepper, 1996). Therefore, at the process level, 




Ninety-two participants took part in the study (55 female) and were recruited using the same 
procedure as in Experiment 1. The procedure was essentially the same as before except for 
two important modifications. We increased incentives to correct role-induced bias in that par-
ticipants could now earn an extra amount of 100 € (approx. USD 140) for predicting the cor-
rect verdict, which was paid in 1 out of 10 cases. The instruction on the screen where partici-
pants indicated their prediction was changed accordingly. As a second modification, right be-
fore the post-test evaluation of the facts, participants indicated how they would have decided 
the case. We expected that the observed effects would be stronger if participants’ predicted 
verdict and their own verdict align.  
Results and Discussion 
As can be seen in Table 1, all important findings could be replicated. Decision time almost 
doubled, which indicates that our manipulation of motivation was effective. Nevertheless, we 
found a role induced bias of equal size also with these higher incentives. Participants in the 
prosecution role convicted 16% more often than participants in the defense role. The effect 
was marginally significant in the logistic regression (b = 0.73, z = 1.47, p = .07, one-sided) 
and reached conventional significance levels when excluding seven participants for which 
predicted and own verdict did not align (b = 0.87, z = 1.91, p = .028, one-sided).
11 We repli-
cate the findings that controlling for information inspections did not reduce but even strength-
en the effect of role on verdict. In contrast, the effect of role disappears when controlling for 
coherence shifts (p > .84). The role-induced bias effect was again significantly mediated by 
coherence shifts (p < .05; b = 0.63 vs. b = -0.11) but not by information inspection. Hence, the 
results again support our two hypotheses. 
We also replicate the other effects observed in Experiment 1. The spreading apart due to co-
herence shifts is stronger for prosecution than for defense, and supporting evidence is less 
affected by coherence shifts than contradicting evidence (Table 1). The result also holds if 
restricting the analysis to persons for which verdict prediction and individuals’ verdict 
aligned. The role-induced bias tended to decrease with time for thinking about the verdict but 
the interaction did not reach significance (b = -1.12, z = -1.18, p = 0.24). Nevertheless, as in 
the previous study in a median spit the quicker half showed the effect (p = .003) whereas the 
slower half did not (p = .23). 
Overall, the results nicely replicate Experiment 1 in an environment with much higher incen-
tives. They provide further support for H1. Role induced bias persists even if there is a strong 
monetary incentive to be accurate, and when controlling for confirmatory information search. 
                                        
11   Six of these persons predicted guilty although their own decision would have been “not guilty”. Only one 
person showed the opposite pattern. Furthermore, as explained in note 7, since we have a directed hy-
pothesis, a one-sided test is in order, so that our finding meets conventional standards.  
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The results also provide further support for H2 stating that role induced bias is driven by co-
herence shifts. Interestingly, also the remaining not hypothesized findings concerning deci-
sion time and coherence shifts could be replicated and seem to constitute stable effects.  If 
participants are sensitive to monetary rewards, in our second experiment they have every rea-
son to overcome a role induced bias. 100 € is about ten times the hourly wage of a research 
assistant. Yet participants may still feel committed to their assigned role and the extrinsic mo-
tivation might hinder intrinsic motivations to overcome the bias. In a third study we therefore 
induced the accuracy goal in a way that excludes a conflict between the role and accuracy. 
After they have handed in their sketch of the pleading, we expose participants to the oppor-
tunity for a plea bargain. We design the bargaining protocol such, and we explicitly tell partic-
ipants, that it now is in the best interest of the side they represent to predict the court ruling 
correctly. With this design, we also get a second, normatively even more relevant dependent 
variable. We not only see how assigned roles bias participants’ judgment (i.e. their predic-
tions), but also how role biases their choices (i.e. their settlement offers).  
Experiment 3 
Method 
Since we had depleted our subject pool, we could only recruit twenty-nine participants (17 
female) for the study. The procedure was essentially the same as in study 2 except for one 
important modification. We removed the monetary incentive for making correct predictions. 
Instead, after participants sketched their pleading and before making verdict predictions they 
were informed that there is a possibility for a plea bargain.  
The negotiation protocol is as follows: prosecutors indicate a minimum sanction. Defense 
counsels indicate a maximum sanction. If the minimum is below the maximum, the midpoint 
between both statements determines the sanction. Otherwise the court decides. The instruc-
tions should make it clear that, given this procedure, it is in the best interest of the side repre-
sented to predict the court ruling correctly (in terms of bargaining theory, the court ruling de-
termines the outside option, see e.g. (Nash, 1950)).  Participants were first asked to make this 
prediction, and were then asked to make a negotiation offer. The instruction was such that the 
range for negotiation offers could be between 0 and 100 monetary punishment units (i.e., dai-
ly rated fines). Participants were free not to make an offer at all. The modified part of the in-
struction is given in the appendix.
12  
Note, that given the bargaining protocol, no side has an interest in making exaggerated offers 
(cf. also Loewenstein et al., 1993). The higher a maximum the defense counsel states, and the 
lower the minimum the prosecutor states, the smaller the probability that a deal is struck, and 
hence the smaller the probability to improve one’s side’s outcome, compared with having the 
court decide. Consequently, with our design, negotiation offers not only provide a second de-
                                        
12   Due to a programming error we did not record decision times for this study.  
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pendent variable. The negotiation procedure also, and critically, makes it detrimental for the 
side represented to be biased. 
Results and Discussion 
Descriptively, the previous findings could be mainly replicated (Table 1). We again find role-
induced bias for predicted verdicts (9%) and subjective probability of guilt (16%).  Results on 
information inspection and coherence shifts are mainly provided for completeness but they 
should be interpreted cautiously given the large standard errors due to the small sample size.  
We were most interested in the effect of role on settlement offers, that is, on choices rather 
than mere predictions, which could be between 0 and 100. As summarized in Table 3, offers 
for prosecution were significantly higher than for defense, t(27) = 5.00, p < .001. Half of the 
participants in the defense role did not want a settlement and indicated zero. Two participants 
in the prosecution role did so either and indicated 100. The role bias, however, remains signif-
icant even if these 10 participants are excluded. Settlement offer correlated with predicted 
verdict (r = .32, p = .09; point-biserial correlation) and subjective probability of guilt (r = .37, 
p = .05) but only at a medium level.  
Table 3: Settlement offers in Experiment 3 
 
   Settlement Offer 
  n M  (SE) f[offer=0] f[offer=100] 
Prosecution 13  70.0  (6.8)  2 
Defense 16  18.4  (7.5)  8  1 
 
Despite the very small sample size, we thus find a significant bias for the normatively most 
relevant dependent measure, plea bargaining offers. Note that, in the instructions, we make it 
clear that exaggerated offers are not in the best interest of the side participants represent and it 
could be assumed that persons were intrinsically motivated to correct role induced bias. Com-
pared with the findings by Loewenstein et al. (1993) on pre-trial settlements, we even observe 
a much stronger bias on settlement offers (i.e., Cohens’ d = 1.9 vs. d = .85), although in their 
study there was no link between negotiations and the court ruling. The stronger effect in our 
study might be partially explained by the fact that writing an outline forces participants to 
elaborate the story supporting their side, and increases sunk costs. However, considering that 
there were multiple differences between these studies, further research is needed to empirical-
ly investigate the driving factors more systematically.   
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General Discussion 
In three studies, we investigate the effect of role-induced bias on legal judgments. We find 
strong role-induced bias even in a situation where we can exclude that it is self-serving since 
participants no longer act on their assigned roles when asked to predict a court ruling, and at 
this point they have neither monetary nor reputational reasons for tilting judgment. They on 
the contrary have a high monetary incentive to make unbiased predictions. And a comparison 
between experiments even indicates that role-induced bias does not decrease if the premium 
for accuracy is as high as ten times the hourly wage of a research assistant. Furthermore, re-
sults of the third experiment indicate that role-induced bias also prevails in situations in which 
persons can be assumed to be intrinsically motivated to make correct predictions.   
The role-induced bias persists when we control for differences in information search. Infor-
mation search has a consistent effect in that people show confirmatory information search and 
look up more often information that fits their final judgments which is, however, independent 
of the role-induced bias. In mediation analysis we show that the role-induced bias is driven by 
coherence shifts (i.e., systematic information distortions) that can be explained by coherence 
based reasoning and parallel constraint satisfaction (PCS) processes. We thus find support for 
the prediction of PCS that role-induced biases are more than just motivated reasoning or se-
lective information search. Once “trapped” in an interpretation, it is hard to leave it and to 
come to a different interpretation. Coherence shifts modify the interpretation of information 
and stabilize these interpretations once they have been formed. Interestingly, though, we 
found in two studies that role-induced bias were absent in participants who took long to take a 
decision even though the effect was smaller with higher incentives. This can either be due to 
the fact that people without bias deliberate longer or that persons can partially correct for bias 
by deliberation. It is due to further research to investigate which effect prevails. 
The finding that role assignment in court induces bias that people on average do not correct 
for even if they have a high incentive to do so and the additional finding that role-induced bias 
even more strongly affects offers for settlements have serious consequences for the legal sys-
tem. The pure assignment of a role, even if there is no self-serving element, may have behav-
ioral effects that cannot easily be reversed. For the law, this finding matters indirectly and 
directly. It matters indirectly since it suggests that those acting in court are indeed very likely 
to be biased. For in the court room, prosecutors and defense counsels have a clear incentive to 
win, with more or less direct relevance for their income. The bias should therefore even be 
stronger than in our deliberately much cleaner environment. This in turn puts the impartiality 
of courts at risk. It is beyond the scope of this paper to investigate to which degree the adver-
sarial system nonetheless helps jury members and judges make unbiased decisions; it might, 
to the contrary, even be counterproductive in that it exacerbates the bias.  
Yet most legal orders are not only concerned with court rulings. They also impose a certain 
degree of impartiality on court procedure (Green & Zacharias, 2004). Some legal orders, like 
the German, even prosecute prosecutors if they bend the law (in German Law: BGHSt 32,  
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357; 38, 282; 40, 177; 40, 272 [Federal Supreme Court for Criminal Law]), and they stipulate 
that defense counsels are “part and parcel of the judiciary”,
13 and therefore obliged to a mini-
mum degree of impartiality. We are of course not opposed against such regulative ideas. Yet 
our findings question the realism of these normative statements.  
Last but not least, prediction is a routine task for real life prosecutors and defense counsels. 
Prosecutors have to decide whether to charge the defendant. Defense counsels have to advise 
their clients whether to plead guilty. Depending on their expectations of the ruling, they de-
cide on their strategy during the trial. They for instance invest more resources, plead more 
aggressively, or appeal against a ruling. Prediction is even more important in plea bargaining. 
Is it worth insisting on the trial? Which offer is good enough to be accepted? In the field, all 
of these decisions of course also have a motivational component. They directly help a defense 
counsel charge higher fees, and they help a prosecutor advance her career. We show that, 
even short of the motivational effect, there is a bias resulting from the mere fact that a person 
assumes a defined role. Procedural law has not only reason to be concerned about “hired 
guns”. Even if neither money nor career concerns were to play a role, representatives would 
still see the world in the light of their cause. 
In our experiments, we investigated deliberation time using an exploratory account. We 
measured time for making a verdict prediction instead of manipulating it. Consequently, we 
do not know whether participants with less bias had a harder time coming to a prediction, or 
whether the fact that they deliberated longer removed both the bias and the coherence shifts. 
We thus do not know the direction of the arrow of causality. If deliberation causes debiasing, 
the normative implication is straightforward. The legal order would want to force those play-
ing an active role in court to deliberate carefully. A cooling off period would be a first step 
into this direction (Simon, Krawczyk, et al., 2008). The obligation to give explicit reasons 
should also help. For this interpretation speaks that Simon (2004) could show that an explicit 
“consider the opposite” instruction reduces coherence shifts as well (see also Glöckner, 2008; 
Mussweiler, Strack, & Pfeiffer, 2000). Against this interpretation speaks that persons are usu-
ally not aware of the fact that they distort information (Simon, 2004).  
If, to the contrary, the cause is that persons without bias take longer to make a prediction and 
these tendencies to make a bias are dependent on stable individual (personality) differences, 
constructing bias-proof proceedings is less easy. The legal order would need a sufficiently 
robust screening procedure. Converging evidence for this causal direction is provided by the 
finding that coherence shifts are indeed related to personality factors in that they increase with 
persons’ preference for consistency (Brown, Asher, & Cialdini, 2005; Cialdini, Trost, & New-
som, 1995; Nail, et al., 2001) and that coherence shifts mediate increases in confidence 
(Glöckner & Ostermann, 2010). Interestingly, it has also been shown that persons that have 
been selected to become jurors in the U.S. (Brown, et al., 2005) as well as real lay judges 
                                        
13   This is referred to by the German term: „ein Organ der Rechtspflege“, § 1 Federal Code for the Legal 
Profession (Bundesrechtsanwaltsordnung).  
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(Schöffen) in Germany (Glöckner & Ostermann, 2010) tend to show higher preference for 
consistency compared to students. Accordingly, it could be expected that coherence effects 
are stronger in persons involved in legal reasoning as compared to the mainly student popula-
tion used in the current study. However the implication that some actors should be barred 
from court would have to be normatively justified and is likely to meet resistance due to the 
fact that jurors and lay judges should be selected such that they represent the general public 
(in German law: §36 II S. 1 GVG [Judicature Act]). Hence, if the second interpretation turned 
out to be true, chances are that the legal order would have to live with the bias in order to 




Anderson, C. A., Lepper, M. R., & Ross, L. (1980). Perseverance of Social Theories. The 
Role of Explanation in the Persistence of Discredited Information. Journal of Personali-
ty and Social Psychology, 39, 1037-1049. 
Babcock, L., & Loewenstein, G. (1997). Explaining Bargaining Impasse. The Role of Self-
Serving Biases. Journal of Economic Perspectives, 11, 109-126. 
Babcock, L., Loewenstein, G., Issacharoff, S., & Camerer, C. F. (1995). Biased Judgements 
of Fairness in Bargaining. American Economic Review, 85, 1337-1343. 
Babcock, L., & Pogarsky, G. (1999). Damage Caps and Settlement. A Behavioral Approach. 
Journal of Legal Studies, 28, 341-370. 
Betsch, T., Haberstroh, S., Glöckner, A., Haar, T., & Fiedler, K. (2001). The effects of routine 
strength on adaptation and information search in recurrent decision making. Organiza-
tional Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 84, 23-53. 
Bilalic, M., McLeod, P., & Gobet, F. (2008). Why good thoughts block better ones: The 
mechanism of the pernicious Einstellung (set) effect. Cognition, 108, 652-661. 
Bilalic, M., McLeod, P., & Gobet, F. (2010). The mechanism of the Einstellung (Set) effect: 
A pervasive source of cognitive bias. Current Directions in Psychological Science, 19, 
111-115. 
Bond, S. D., Carlson, K. A., Meloy, M. G., Russo, J. E., & Tanner, R. J. (2007). Information 
distortion in the evaluation of a single option. Organizational Behavior and Human De-
cision Processes, 102, 240-254. 
Brown, S., Asher, T., & Cialdini, R. (2005). Evidence of a positive relationship between age 
and preference for consistency. Journal of Research in Personality, 39, 517-533. 
Brownstein, A. L. (2003). Biased predecision processing. Psychological Bulletin, 129, 545-
568. 
Brownstein, A. L., Read, S. J., & Simon, D. (2004). Bias at the racetrack: Effects of individu-
al expertise and task importance on predecision reevaluation of alternatives. Personality 
and Social Psychology Bulletin, 30, 891-904. 
Carlson, K. A., & Russo, J. E. (2001). Biased interpretation of evidence by mock jurors. 
Journal of Experimental Psychology: Applied, 7, 91-103. 
Cialdini, R., Trost, M., & Newsom, J. (1995). Preference for consistency: The development of 
a valid measure and the discovery of surprising behavioral implications. Journal of Per-
sonality and Social Psychology, 69, 318-328.  
21 
Daftary-Kapur, T., Dumas, R., & Penrod, S. D. (2010). Jury decision-making biases and 
methods to counter them. Legal and Criminological Psychology, 15, 133-154. 
DeKay, M. L., Patino-Echeverri, D., & Fischbeck, P. S. (2009a). Better Safe than Sorry: Pre-
cautionary Reasoning and Implied Dominance in Risky Decisions. Journal of Behav-
ioral Decision Making, 22, 338-361. 
DeKay, M. L., Patino-Echeverri, D., & Fischbeck, P. S. (2009b). Distortion of probability and 
outcome information in risky decisions. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision 
Processes, 109, 79-92. 
Ender, P. (2010). binary_mediation: a new command to compute mediations with multiple 
mediators and binary and continuous variables in STATA. UCLA: Academic Technolo-
gy Services, Statistical Consulting Group. 
 http://www.ats.ucla.edu/stat/stata/ado/analysis/. 
Englich, B., Mussweiler, T., & Strack, F. (2005). The last word in court - A hidden disad-
vantage for the defense. Law and Human Behavior, 29, 705-722. 
Festinger, L. (1957). A theory of cognitive dissonance. Stanford, CA: Stanford University 
Press. 
Fiedler, K. (2000). Beware of samples! A cognitive-ecological sampling approach to judg-
ment biases. Psychological Review, 107, 659-676. 
Glöckner, A. (2008). How evolution outwits bounded rationality: The efficient interaction of 
automatic and deliberate processes in decision making and implications for institutions. 
In C. Engel & W. Singer (Eds.), Better than conscious? Decision making, the human 
mind, and implications for institutions (pp. 259-284). Cambridge, MA: MIT Press. 
Glöckner, A. (2009). Investigating intuitive and deliberate processes statistically: The Multi-
ple-Measure Maximum Likelihood strategy classification method. Judgment and Deci-
sion Making, 4, 186-199. 
Glöckner, A. (2010). Multiple measure strategy classification: Outcomes, decision times and 
confidence ratings. In A. Glöckner & C. L. M. Witteman (Eds.), Foundations for trac-
ing intuition: Challenges and methods. (pp. 83-105). London: Psychology Press & 
Routledge. 
Glöckner, A., & Betsch, T. (2008). Modeling option and strategy choices with connectionist 
networks: Towards an integrative model of automatic and deliberate decision making. 
Judgment and Decision Making, 3, 215–228. 
Glöckner, A., Betsch, T., & Schindler, N. (2010). Coherence shifts in probabilistic inference 
tasks. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 23, 439–462.  
22 
Glöckner, A., & Engel, C. (2008). Can we trust intuitive jurors? Standards of proof and the 
probative value of evidence in coherence based reasoning. MPI Collective Goods Pre-
print, No. 38. Available at SSRN: http://ssrn.com/abstract=1307580. 
Glöckner, A., & Ostermann, T. (2010). Preference for consistency increases the coherence 
effect and confidence in legal judgments. Manuscript in preparation. 
Goodman-Delahunty, J., Granhag, P. A., Hartwig, M., & Loftus, E. F. (2010). Insightful or 
wishful: Lawyers' ability to predict case outcomes. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 
16, 133-157. 
Green, B., & Zacharias, F. (2004). Prosecutorial neutrality. Wisconsin Law Review, 837-904. 
Guthrie, C., Rachlinski, J. J., & Wistrich, A. J. (2000). Inside the judicial mind. Cornell Law 
Review, 86, 777-830. 
Guthrie, C., Rachlinski, J. J., & Wistrich, A. J. (2007). Blinking on the bench: How judges 
decide cases. Cornell Law Review, 93, 1-44. 
Haney, C., Banks, C., & Zimbardo, P. (1973). Study of prisoners and guards in a simulated 
prison. Naval Research Reviews, 26, 1-17. 
Hastie, R., Schkade, D. A., & Payne, J. W. (1999a). Juror judgments in civil cases: Effects of 
plaintiff's requests and plaintiff's identity on punitive damage awards. Law and Human 
Behavior, 23, 445-470. 
Hastie, R., Schkade, D. A., & Payne, J. W. (1999b). Juror judgments in civil cases: Hindsight 
effects on judgments of liability for punitive damages. Law and Human Behavior, 23, 
597-614. 
Holyoak, K. J., & Simon, D. (1999). Bidirectional reasoning in decision making by constraint 
satisfaction. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 128, 3-31. 
Janis, I., & King, B. (1954). The influence of role playing on opinion change. Journal of Ab-
normal and Social Psychology, 49, 211-218. 
Jolls, C., & Sunstein, C. R. (2006). Debiasing through Law. The Journal of Legal Studies, 35, 
199-241. 
Korobkin, R. (2003). The endowment effect and legal analysis. Northwestern University Law 
Review, 97, 1227-1294. 
Kunda, Z. (1990). The case for motivated reasoning. Psychological Bulletin, 108, 480-498. 
Kunda, Z., & Thagard, P. (1996). Forming impressions from stereotypes, traits, and behav-
iors: A parallel-constraint-satisfaction theory. Psychological Review, 103, 284-308.  
23 
Landeo, C. (2009). Cognitive Coherence and Tort Reform. Journal of Economic Psychology, 
30, 898-912. 
Loewenstein, G., Issacharoff, S., Camerer, C. F., & Babcock, L. (1993). Self-Serving As-
sessments of Fairness and Pretrial Bargaining. Journal of Legal Studies, 22, 135-159. 
MacKinnon, D. P., & Dwyer, J. H. (1993). Estimating mediated effects in prevention studies. 
Evaluation Review, 17, 144. 
Markman, K. D., & Hirt, E. R. (2002). Social Prediction and the “Allegiance Bias”. Social 
Cognition, 20, 58-86. 
Monroe, B. M., & Read, S. J. (2008). A general connectionist model of attitude structure and 
change: The ACS (Attitudes as Constraint Satisfaction) model. Psychological Review, 
115, 733-759. 
Mussweiler, T., Strack, F., & Pfeiffer, T. (2000). Overcoming the inevitable anchoring effect: 
Considering the opposite compensates for selective accessibility. Personality and Social 
Psychology Bulletin, 26, 1142-1150. 
Nail, P. R., Correll, J. S., Drake, C. E., Glenn, S. B., Scott, G. M., & Stuckey, C. (2001). A 
validation study of the preference for consistency scale. Personality and Individual Dif-
ferences, 31, 1193-1202. 
Nash, J. (1950). The Bargaining Problem. Econometrica, 18, 155-162. 
Norman, E., & Schulte-Mecklenbeck, M. (2010). Take a quick click at that! Mouselab and 
Eye-Tracking as tools to measure intuition. In A. Glöckner & C. L. M. Witteman (Eds.), 
Tracing intuition: Recent methods in measuring intuitive and deliberate processes in 
decision making. (pp. 24-44). London: Psychology Press / Routledge. 
O'Brien, B. (2009). Prime suspect: An examination of factors that aggravate and counteract 
confirmation bias in criminal investigations. Psychology, Public Policy, and Law, 15, 
315-334. 
Payne, J. W., Bettman, J. R., & Johnson, E. J. (1988). Adaptive strategy selection in decision 
making. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and Cognition, 14, 
534-552. 
Pennington, N., & Hastie, R. (1988). Explanation-based decision making: Effects of memory 
structure on judgment. Journal of Experimental Psychology: Learning, Memory, and 
Cognition, 14, 521-533. 
Preacher, K., & Hayes, A. (2008). Asymptotic and resampling strategies for assessing and 
comparing indirect effects in multiple mediator models. Behavior Research Methods, 
40, 879.  
24 
Rachlinski, J. J. (2006). Cognitive errors, individual differences, and paternalism. University 
of Chicago Law Review, 73, 207-229. 
Read, S. J., Vanman, E. J., & Miller, L. C. (1997). Connectionism, parallel constraint satisfac-
tion processes, and Gestalt principles: (Re)introducing cognitive dynamics to social 
psychology. Personality and Social Psychology Review, 1, 26-53. 
Robbennolt, J. K. (2004). Evaluating juries by comparison to judges: A benchmark for judg-
ing. Florida State University Law Review, 32, 469-509. 
Russo, J. E., Carlson, K. A., Meloy, M. G., & Yong, K. (2008). The goal of consistency as a 
cause of information distortion. Journal of Experimental Psychology: General, 137, 
456-470. 
Russo, J. E., Meloy, M. G., & Medvec, V. H. (1998). Predecisional distortion of product in-
formation. Journal of Marketing Research, 35, 438-452. 
Shultz, T. R., & Lepper, M. R. (1996). Cognitive dissonance reduction as constraint satisfac-
tion. Psychological Review, 103, 219-240. 
Simon, D. (2004). A third view of the black box: cognitive coherence in legal decision mak-
ing. University of Chicago Law Review, 71, 511-586. 
Simon, D., Krawczyk, D. C., Bleicher, A., & Holyoak, K. J. (2008). The transience of con-
structed preferences. Journal of Behavioral Decision Making, 21, 1-14. 
Simon, D., Krawczyk, D. C., & Holyoak, K. J. (2004). Construction of preferences by con-
straint satisfaction. Psychological Science, 15, 331-336. 
Simon, D., Snow, C. J., & Read, S. J. (2004). The Redux of Cognitive Consistency Theories: 
Evidence Judgments by Constraint Satisfaction. Journal of Personality and Social Psy-
chology, 86, 814-837. 
Simon, D., Stenstrom, D. M., & Read, S. J. (2008). On the objectivity of investigations: An 
experiment Paper presented at the Conference for Empirical Legal Studies.  
Simon, D., Stenstrom, D. M., & Read, S. J. (2009). Partisanship and prosecutorial decision 
making: An experiment Paper presented at the Conference for Empirical Legal Studies.  
Snyder, M., & Swann, W. B. (1978). Hypothesis-testing processes in social interactions. 
Journal of Personality and Social Psychology, 36, 1202-1212. 
Sobel, M. E. (1982). Asymptotic confidence intervals for indirect effects in structural equa-
tion models. Sociological Methodology, 13, 290-312.  
25 
Spellman, B. A. (2010). Judges, expertise, and analogy. In D. Klein & G. Mitchell (Eds.), The 
Psychology of Judicial Decision Making (pp. 149-163). Oxford: Oxford University 
Press. 
Sunstein, C. (1996). Social norms and social roles. Columbia Law Review, 96, 903-968. 
Thagard, P. (2003). Why wasn't O.J. convicted? Emotional coherence in legal inference. Cog-
nition & Emotion, 17, 361-383. 
Thompson, L., & Loewenstein, G. (1992). Egocentric interpretations of fairness and interper-
sonal conflict. Organizational Behavior and Human Decision Processes, 51, 176-197. 
Vidmar, N., & Laird, N. M. (1983). Adversary social roles: Their effects on witnesses com-
munication of evidence and the assessments of adjudicators. Journal of Personality and 
Social Psychology, 44, 888-898. 
Wason, P. C. (1960). On the failure to eliminate hypotheses in a conceptual task. Quarterly 
Journal of Experimental Psychology, 12, 129-140. 
Wistrich, A. J., Guthrie, C., & Rachlinski, J. J. (2005). Can judges ignore inadmissible infor-
mation? The difficulty of deliberately disregarding. University of Pennsylvania Law Re-
view, 153, 1251-1345. 
Zimbardo, P. (1965). The effect of effort and improvisation on self-persuasion produced by 






[page 1] You now take part in a trial on the case Hans H. at a reginal court.  
[page 2] Please assume to be in the role of a legal intern. You are currently working for the 
[defense/ prosecution]. Your advisor asks you to take part in the criminal trial Hans H. taking 
the perspective of the [defense / prosecution].  You will take part in the trial and hear all ar-
guments of the defense and the prosecution. Afterwards you will be asked to sketch a pledge 
for the [defense / prosecution]. 
[page 3: Standard of Proof] Please note that in criminal cases accused persons are particularly 
protected. They should only be convicted if the evidence is so convincing that there is no rea-
sonable doubt that the person is guilty. Proof beyond a reasonable doubt is proof that leaves 
you firmly convinced that the defendant is guilty. It is not required to prove guilt beyond all 
possible doubt. A reasonable doubt is a doubt based upon reason and common sense and is 
not based purely on speculation. It may arise from a careful and impartial consideration of all 
the evidence, or from lack of evidence. If after a careful and impartial consideration of all the 
evidence, the judge is not convinced beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant is guilty, it 
is his or her duty to find the defendant not guilty. On the other hand, if after a careful and im-
partial consideration of all the evidence, the judge is convinced beyond a reasonable doubt 
that the defendant is guilty, it is his duty to find the defendant guilty. 
[page 4] Hence, the judge has to come to one of the following conclusions: 
If he concludes that there is no reasonable doubt, that the accused person has committed the 
crime then he has to decide guilty. If he comes to the conclusion that there is reasonable 
doubt, he has to decide not guilty.  
[page 5: Accusation] Hans H. is accused of having stolen 5200 € from the safe of his employ-
er Hausbau GmbH.  
[page 6] Prosecution and defense bring forth the following pieces of evidence. All witnesses 
have sworn under oath to make statements that correspond to the truth only and have been 
warned that false statements can lead to criminal proceedings for perjury. After the hearing, 
the judge dictates a summary of the witness statements for the protocol. He reads the sum-
mary aloud and all witnesses agree that their statement was correctly documented.  
[page 7: Technician] A technician who had been called to repair the photocopier testified that 
he had seen someone leave the accounts office in great haste at about 7.15 pm. When ques-
tioned by the detective a day after the incident, the technician identified this person as Hans. 
When asked how sure he was about this, the technician said he was “at least 95%” certain. He 
explained that he had seen Hans once or twice before in the office.   
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[page 8: School] Silvia, a manager of “Hausbau GmbH”, testified that she saw Hans at 8 pm 
on the evening in question, when they both picked up their children from an event at the 
school. Hans was wearing elegant trousers and a jacket he had not worn at work. Silvia testi-
fied that it takes between 45 and 50 minutes at that time of day to get from the office to the 
school at the other end of town.   
[page 9: Safe] The accountant of the company witnesses: At the end of each day, she places 
all company cash in the safe. This safe is located at the rear of the accounts office. The safe is 
also used to store other sensitive documents, including bids and project reports. Apart from 
the accountant and her assistant, the construction managers, sales managers and managers 
have access to the safe. All in all, 8 people, including Hans, can use the safe. The safe has a 
time mechanism that records when the safe is opened and closed. One morning the accountant 
noticed that € 5,200 in cash was missing. The time mechanism showed that the safe had last 
been opened on the previous evening at 7:14 pm. 
[page 10: Hans’s career] The boss of Hausbau GmbH witnesses: Hans H. is 34 years old. He 
lives in Frankfurt/Main with his wife, Katrin, and two children. Hans works for the large con-
struction firm “Hausbau GmbH” (Hausbau Ltd.). After having worked as a foreman for more 
than two years, he complained to his superior that the job caused him back trouble. He (the 
boss) then offered Hans a job in the company’s administration offices, assigning him the role 
of construction manager. Hans’ task was to supervise the progress made on the various build-
ing projects and to coordinate the different groups. 
[page 11: Hans’s character] A colleague says: Hans is generally considered to be a hard-
working colleague. His colleagues say that he often seems reserved and at times even a little 
grumpy. 
[page 12: Criminal record] The judge reads aloud Hans’ criminal record. At the age of 18, he 
was arrested for attempting to break into an apartment. He was convicted of this offence. 
Hans H. has not had a criminal record for the last 16 years.  
[page 13: White car] Private detective P says: Hausbau GmbH has asked him to investigate 
the case. A CCTV camera, installed at the entrance of the office building, shows a car rapidly 
leaving a parking space in front of the building at 7:17 pm on the evening in question. How-
ever, the picture was out of focus and the detective was unable to read the license plate. The 
video shows a white XY car. The make of Hans H.’s car is XY, it is white, and he seen was 
seen driving to work in it on the day in question. According to the detectives’ investigations, 
0.1% of all cars in the area are white XY cars.   
[page 14: Debts] Furthermore, the detective says: He also found out that Hans paid back a 
loan of € 4,870 to his bank one day after the money had disappeared. The debts had accumu-
lated in the last three months, and the bank had already threatened to take legal action.   
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[page 15: Flower store] Hans testified that he had taken out the loan to help his sister-in-law, 
who runs a flower shop in Aachen. She gave him back the money in cash and he used it to 
pay back the loan. Hans explained that he cannot prove this cash transfer with receipts, since 
in the floral business larger financial transactions are sometimes conducted in cash.  
[page 16: Travel expenses] A colleague testifies that Hans H. told him the following: A few 
months before the incident, Hans had been summoned by his boss to discuss the payment of 
expenses claimed by Hans. Visibly annoyed, the boss had given out to Hans for claiming cer-
tain expenses with no justification. Hans had argued that other construction managers had 
been claiming the same expenses and that the boss had therefore been challenging him unjust-
ly. His boss had disagreed, refusing to reimburse these costs and also making clear to him that 
a promotion he had already been promised would fall through on account of these events. 
Hans had been deeply hurt by this. In the following weeks, he had quite frequently been seen 
working late at the office.”  
[page 17] The judge interrupts the trial for half an hour. Please use the time to sketch a pledge 
for the [defence / prosecution]. You can therefore look up all the record in the protocol.  
[page 18] You have 20 min tome to sketch the pledge. Bullet-points suffice. You can check 
the evidence for the case as often as you like. 
[page 19; sketch of pledge in a text-box; inspection of pages above possible]  
[page 20] Please predict, which decision the judge will make. Please assume that he has exact-
ly the same information as you and that your pledge has no influence on the decision.  We 
have asked several real judges, how they would have decided the case. You receive a bonus 
payment of 5 €, if you predict the decision of the majority of judges correctly.  
Modified Instruction for Experiment 3 
The instruction for participants’ verdict prediction (i.e., page 20) was modified and a new 
page 21 with an instruction to measure offers for the settlement was added directly afterwards. 
The modified parts read as follows:  
Given a request of the [prosecution/defense; i.e., the other party], the judge postpones the trial 
to the next day. The representative of the [prosecution/defense; i.e., the other party] asks you 
whether you would want to end the trial with an out-of-court settlement. If both sides agree on 
a sanction the trial would be finished. It is known that in similar cases guilty persons were 
convicted for a daily rated fine of 100 days by this judge. Hence, the accused had to pay his 
net income of 100 days to the state. Whether a settlement is beneficial for the [de-
fense/prosecution; i.e., your side] depends on the expected verdict. To help you, representing 
the [defense/prosecution; i.e., your side] well, please predict the verdict of the judge you ex-
pect. [Hans will be acquitted / convicted]  
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[page 21] To assure a fair negotiation, you agree with the [prosecution/defense; i.e., the other 
party] to the following procedure: [You / the prosecution] note[s] the minimum day rate the 
accused has to accept in a closed letter. [The defense /you] write[s] the maximum day rate the 
accused is willing to pay to the state in another closed letter. You switch letters and the set-
tlement will become active if the accused is willing to accept a day rate that is at least as high 
as the prosecution expects. Otherwise the judge decides. If the settlement becomes active, the 
day rate will be accepted that lies exactly in the middle between minimum request and maxi-
mum offer. Please now indicate the [minimum number of days the accused has to accept (if 
you do not want to make a settlement indicate 100) / the maximum number of days the ac-
cused is willing to pay (if you do not want to make a settlement indicate 0)].   
 